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Abstract 
Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the 
relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations.  
Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between 
those kinds of evaluations and descriptions of the world. It does so in hope of providing 
traction against naturalism-inspired ontological and epistemological worries threatening 
more ‘realist’ positions.  This is a familiar position regarding ethical discourse; however, 
some authors (e.g. Field, Heller, Gibbard, Blackburn, Chrisman) have recently defended 
a similar view regarding epistemic discourse. Others (especially Kvanvig, Cuneo, and 
Lynch) have argued that epistemic expressivism faces special problems, not necessarily 
attaching to expressivism about other areas. Their arguments differ in interesting ways, 
but the common strategy is an attempt to show that the very sort of meta-epistemological 
theorizing needed to articulate and establish epistemic expressivism involves the 
epistemic expressivist in some sort of internal incoherence or self-defeat. That is, they 
think that articulating or defending the position requires implicit commitment to the 
negation of one of the positions core tenets. This paper responds to those arguments on 
behalf of epistemic expressivism, suggesting that they each misunderstand what is crucial 
to epistemic expressivism. By responding to these arguments, we hope to achieve more 
clarity about what epistemic expressivism is and why one might want to endorse it in a 
meta-epistemology. 
Keywords: epistemic expressivism, meta-epistemology, epistemic irrealism 
                                                     
1 For helpful feedback on this paper, we would like to thank Terrence Cuneo, Klemens Kappel, 
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IS EPISTEMIC EXPRESSIVISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH INQUIRY? 
1 February 2011 
 
1. Introduction 
In search of a satisfactory account of moral thought and practice, ethical expressivists 
encourage us to ask not about the nature of ethical value but rather about the nature of 
ethical evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting 
disanalogy between ethical evaluations and descriptions of the world. We might call this 
change in question and the subsequent answer by disanalogy the core expressivist 
maneuver. For example, Gibbard writes, “The expressivists’ strategy is to change the 
question. Don’t ask directly how to define ‘good’…[rather] shift the question to focus on 
judgments: ask, say, what judging that [something] is good consists in”(2003: 6). In early 
crude forms, the core expressivist maneuver involved the idea that ethical evaluations are 
expressions of our noncognitive sentiments rather than our cognitive representations of 
things in the world. In later more refined versions, expressivists have argued that ethical 
evaluations are expressions of a special kind of belief, whose role in our cognitive 
economy is importantly practical rather than representational. In both cases, the 
expressivist account of the nature of ethical evaluations is supposed to provide crucial 
traction against ontological and epistemological problems motivated by naturalism that 
threaten more ‘realist’ approaches to accounting for the nature of ethical value. 
The basic thought is that, by construing ethical evaluations as interestingly 
disanalogous to descriptions of the world, we do not have to countenance in our ontology 
something—ethical facts or values—epistemic access to which is potentially mysterious 
and elusive; rather we can investigate something that is quite common—ethical 
evaluations—by the typical philosophical means by which we come to understand our 
thoughts and practices. Although it is sometimes seen as a debunking position, there is 
nothing in expressivism that requires us to stop thinking ethical thoughts or to disengage 
from ethical practice. The view is a meta-ethical view about the nature of ethical thought 
and practice, which is supposed to be neutral with respect to various plausible views one 
might defend in the course of engaging in ethical thought and practice. 
There is a healthy debate in metaethics about the viability of this sort of position, 
which has led to a number of difficult critical questions: can the expressivist satisfactorily 
account for the semantics of ethical language, inferences involving ethical thoughts, 
ordinary talk of ethical truths and propositions, the appearance of ethical knowledge, the 
possibility of fundamental ethical error, and the general distinction between realism and 
antirealism? Our project here, however, is not to enter into this debate. Rather our project 
stems from apparently close parallels between the issues driving that debate and issues in 
epistemology. 
Recent epistemology has taken a distinctively metaepistemological turn: questions 
about the semantics of epistemic language and the nature of epistemic values have 
become prominent. And, although epistemologists have been slow to see this, this turn 
clearly raises the question of the viability of an epistemic analogue to ethical 
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expressivism. That is, in search of a satisfactory account of epistemic thought and 
practice, the epistemic expressivist would redeploy the core expressivist maneuver by 
encouraging us to ask not about the nature of epistemic facts or values but rather about 
the nature of epistemic evaluations. And he would claim some interesting disanalogy 
between epistemic evaluations and descriptions of the world. Such a disanalogy would be 
metaepistemologically interesting if it meant that we do not have to countenance in our 
ontology something—epistemic facts or values—epistemic access to which is potentially 
mysterious and elusive, and could instead investigate something that is quite common—
epistemic evaluations—by the typical philosophical means by which we come to 
understand our thoughts and practices. (If epistemic facts and values don’t appear 
potentially as mysterious and elusive as ethical facts and values, notice that there’s as 
little agreement in epistemology about what constitutes a belief’s being justified as in 
ethics about what constitutes an action’s being justified.) Again, such an expressivist 
position may seem to some to be a debunking position; however, if the parallel to ethical 
expressivism is tight, it need not be. There should be nothing in ethical expressivism that 
requires us to stop thinking ethical thoughts or to disengage from ethical practice, so why 
think there has to be something in epistemic expressivism that requires us to stop thinking 
epistemic thoughts or to disengage from epistemic practice? Epistemic expressivism is a 
meta-epistemological view about the nature of epistemic thought and practice, which is 
supposed to be neutral with respect to various plausible views one might defend in the 
course of engaging in first-order epistemic thought and practice.2 
We remain unsure about the viability of epistemic expressivism. For many of the 
problems threatening ethical expressivism are general problems allegedly stemming from 
the core expressivist maneuver, and so they threaten epistemic versions of expressivism 
too. However, there are three recent attempts to argue against epistemic expressivism – 
due to Kvanvig (2003), Cuneo (2008), and Lynch (2009) – that seek to identify some 
special problem with expressivism as deployed in meta-epistemology. Our goal in this 
paper is to rebut these arguments, which will put us in a position to make more precise 
that to which epistemic expressivism is committed and why epistemologists might want 
to consider it as a live option in developing their meta-theory. 
 
2. Kvanvig on “Epistemic Nonfactualism” 
The first argument against epistemic expressivism that we want to consider is gleaned 
from Kvanvig’s (2003) criticism of Field’s (1996, 1998) non-factualism about a priori 
justification. However, the point Kvanvig makes should generalize to broader sorts of 
epistemic expressivism. Field suggests that in calling a belief (he is specifically 
concerned with beliefs in logical truths) “a priori justified” we are not describing some 
independently existing fact about the belief’s having the property of being a priori 
justified; rather, we are in some sense expressing an attitude or stance. He writes, “we 
should have a non-factualist attitude towards justification…; it is a matter of policy rather 
than fact,…and the question is only whether it is a good policy. It makes no sense to ask 
whether logic really is justifiable a priori” (1996: 377). This represents a form of 
                                                     
2 Several authors have defended something like the view. See Blackburn (1996), Field (1996, 
1998, 2009), Gibbard (2003: ch. 10), Chrisman (2007). 
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epistemic expressivism, as we are conceiving of the view, because Field is claiming that a 
certain species of epistemic evaluations are not to be understood in terms of their 
purporting to represent epistemic facts or values but rather in terms of what it is to 
evaluate some belief in this way. His idea is roughly that, in claiming that S’s belief that p 
is a priori justified, we are taking up a positive stance towards evidential norms that 
would license S’s believing that p, even though that belief is not based on empirical 
observation. And, crucially, taking up a positive stance does not constitute a commitment 
to the existence of some kind of property—a priori justification—that this belief has.  
This idea can be generalized (as Field himself does in his 2009) by picking up on 
another idea that Field uses to motivate it. He suggests that there are competing epistemic 
standards in play whenever we evaluate a belief as justified to a degree sufficient for 
knowledge. These include at least reliability and power. And he argues that, in any given 
case, there is no fact of the matter about how we should weigh these competing 
considerations, and so to say that someone’s belief (in a theory, Field seems to think) is 
justified is not to state a fact, but rather, to adopt a stance/policy. And, if we think that 
knowledge requires justification, knowledge attributions would also, at least in part, 
involve the adoption of a stance/policy rather than a simple statement of fact.  
Kvanvig argues that this sort of epistemic expressivism is incoherent because any 
defense of the view will have to presuppose the truth of certain norms of justification and 
explanation. That is: defending the view involves claiming that epistemic expressivism is 
better justified than its competitors. However, according to him that means that the 
epistemic expressivist like Field has to presuppose what his position is designed to 
reject—namely, that some normative epistemic claims are true. As Kvanvig writes, “The 
simple point is that arguments and explanations presuppose the truth of epistemic norms, 
and if the norms themselves are given non-alethic status, then the explanations and 
arguments are simply defective in virtue of the fact that their presuppositions are not 
true”(2003: 176). 
The mistake we see in this argument is the assumption that the expressivist has to 
give epistemic norms “non-alethic status”. We take it that what Kvanvig means is that the 
expressivist has to deny that claims of the form ‘Belief-forming method X is better than 
belief-forming method Y’, or ‘Z is a good way to form beliefs’ and so also claims of the 
form ‘S is justified in believing that p’ or ‘Belief B is reasonable’ are truth-apt. However, 
that is simply a mistake about the nature of expressivism. To be sure, the earliest 
expressivists (e.g., Carnap and Ayer) denied that at least some normative claims are truth-
apt. However, the dominant expressivist strategy in the recent literature in metaethics has 
been to grant the cogency of ordinary normative discourse, which clearly treats normative 
claims as truth-apt, but then to explain the idea of a normative truth in a non-
representationalist way. Indeed, a popular way to do this is to adopt something like the 
deflationary theory of truth that Field himself forcefully champions. The details get 
complicated, but the very basic idea is not: When we say that a sentence S is true, we 
should not understand this as the claim that S has some special (robust) property — that is 
shared by all and only true sentences; rather, we should understand this as embodying 
just the same commitments as a bare assertion ‘S’ would. From ‘S’ is true, we can 
disquote to get: S, which is why the truth predicate is sometimes called a disquotational 
device.  
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 So, since Field himself is a deflationist about truth, he is going to have no problem 
at all with the idea that arguing for his theory presupposes that some normative epistemic 
claims are true, for that will just come to the presupposition of some epistemic norms, 
and he thinks such presuppositions are not factual statements but rather the adoption of 
stances or policies.3 In fact, this is now what he explicitly says. He writes, “in my view, 
the word ‘true’ has an important logical role that is as important for normative claims as 
for others” (2009: 267). The same is true with any other form of epistemic expressivism 
that follows recent ethical expressivists in granting the cogency of treating normative 
claims as truth-apt. Thus, on any reasonable version of epistemic expressivism, there is 
going to be no problem with accepting the key idea behind Kvanvig’s criticism—viz., 
that epistemic evaluations are truth-apt. It is just that it will always be argued that this 
doesn’t commit one to anything more than one is committed to in making the bare 
epistemic evaluations. And, as we insisted at the outset, epistemic expressivists, like 
ethical expressivists, don’t encourage us to stop engaging in the practice of epistemic 
evaluation; they simply offer a different account of what this involves.  
Now, Kvanvig might respond by insisting that he means something other than 
mere truth-aptness by ‘alethic status’ when he imputes to the expressivist the idea that 
epistemic norms don’t have alethic status. For example, maybe he means that epistemic 
expressivists are committed to rejecting any ontological commitment to objective 
epistemic facts or values. We’ll discuss these ideas more in §3 and §4 below; for now, 
however, let us say that is far from clear that there is anything incoherent or self-
undermining about rejecting such ontological commitments while going on to defend a 
philosophical theory. If you reason using reductio ad absurdum, for example, it is far 
from clear that you are presupposing that there is an objective fact of the matter about the 
correctness of classical logic (over, say, intuitionist logic). Maybe you are just adopting 
the policy of using classical logic for your present argumentative purposes; your 
argument will be convincing to anyone who has similarly adopted this policy, regardless 
of whether there is an objective fact of the matter about the correctness of classical logic. 
So, it seems that either Kvanvig has misinterpreted epistemic expressivism, or he has 
assumed something much too strong in his argument against it. 4  
 
                                                     
3 Of course, that move raises a deeper issue about drawing the distinction between realism and 
irrealism. Field has a proposal, which is discussed in his 1994. Many others have discussed this 
issue. See footnote 10 below for further discussion and references. In any case, this is an issue 
about the viability of expressivism in general and not about the viability of epistemic 
expressivism in particular. At the outset we set such general issues aside in hopes of getting clear 
about local arguments against epistemic expressivism. 
4 Kvanvig offers an independent argument against epistemic expressivism, which he calls the 
“Spock-Problem”. This stems from his idea that Spock-like individuals who are highly intelligent 
but lack any affective states at all are possible and, were they to exist, they could still have 
knowledge. We’re unsure of this possibility (how would such an individual ever be motivated to 
pursue more evidence for a hypothesis?). However, in any case, it wouldn’t undermine epistemic 
expressivism since this view isn’t about the states of the putative knower but about the state of 
mind expressed by one who attributes knowledge, which, in this case, is one of us humans who 
do possess affective states. So, we won’t discuss this objection more here. 
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3. Cuneo on “Nontraditional Expressivism” in Epistemology 
The next argument against epistemic expressivism that we want to consider comes from 
Cuneo (2008), who is sensitive to the popularity of deflationary accounts of notions like 
‘truth’ among contemporary ethical expressivists. This allows for what he calls 
“nontraditional versions of expressivism”, such as the quasi-realist views defended by 
Blackburn (1998), Timmons (1999) and Gibbard (2003). Extending their program from 
metaethics to meta-epistemology, Cuneo thinks, provides for a version of epistemic 
expressivism that “proves to be a resourceful view capable of incorporating realist-
seeming elements that allow it to respond to objections—in some cases, convincingly 
so—that are commonly leveled against it” (2008: 145). Nevertheless, he thinks that 
nontraditional versions of epistemic expressivism fail. In this section, we will outline his 
argument and say how we think the epistemic expressivist should respond.  
As Cuneo sees things, what distinguishes most nontraditional expressivists from 
their traditional forbearers is the acceptance of a “deflationary package” which allows 
them to say much of the same things that realists say, but without a commitment to the 
ontology of realism.5 So, in the case of epistemic expressivism, nontraditional 
expressivists will be able to accept claims about the truth of epistemic statements. This 
means that, for some evaluative sentence S, as long as the expressivist has a cogent 
irrealist account of the evaluations we make by stating S, there will be no ontological 
commitment added in recognizing the possibility that S is true. To recognize the 
possibility that S is true is just to recognize the possibility that S. This is what Cuneo 
refers to as the “deflationary sense of truth,” which allows him to articulate a thesis of 
nontraditional epistemic expressivism as a modification of the traditional expressivist’s 
denial of truth-aptness. This is the “Modified Alethic Thesis: The contents of some 
epistemic claims are true, but only in a deflationary sense”(Ibid.: 147). 
Moreover, as is familiar from the literature on deflationism, this view about truth 
allows for a distinction between two ways of thinking of propositions. If propositions are 
thought of as the primary bearers of truth-values, we have the notion of propositions as 
the bearers of truth-values on a nondeflationary understanding of what it is to be true or 
false, but we now also have the notion of a proposition as the bearer of truth-values on a 
deflationary understanding of what it is to be true or false. As Cueno sets things up, the 
term ‘proposition’ is reserved for the former, which he sees as “representational”; and he 
calls the latter ‘quasi-propositions’, which he conceives as “nonrepresentational”. This 
                                                     
5 He allows for another kind of nontraditional expressivism he calls “maximalist expressivism”.  
This is not the metaepistemological analog of the metaethical expressivism defended by people 
like Blackburn, Gibbard, and Timmons; rather it is a view that follows Wright and Horwich in 
treating truth as a “minimal” property and so epistemic facts as real but mere “shadows” – in the 
sense of Wright (1992: 181-182) – of minimally true epistemic sentences.  He counts this as a 
form of expressivism because of its capacity to deny that there are epistemic facts and values as 
the realist understands these things.  However, we remain unconvinced that such a view is 
properly viewed as a form of expressivism, so our focus here will be mostly on what he says 
about expressivist views that adopt what he calls the deflationary package.  However, we’ll note 
(in footnote 8) below one way that appealing to “maximalist expressivism” might provide a 
rejoinder to our counterargument and explain there why we think this won’t help in the present 
dialectical context. 
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allows him to articulate another thesis of nontraditional epistemic expressivism as a 
modification of the traditional expressivist’s claim that pure ethical claims are not the 
assertions of a proposition. This is the “Modified Speech-Act Thesis: When an agent 
sincerely utters a predicative epistemic sentence, that agent does not thereby assert an 
epistemic proposition, but rather ‘asserts’ an epistemic quasi-proposition” (Ibid.). 
Finally, whichever way one understands the notion of a proposition, it is natural 
to understand the notion of a fact as a true proposition. Cuneo suggests that this allows 
for a further distinction between ‘fact’ as the realist understands this notion and ‘fact’ as 
the deflationist understands it. Again, he reserves the term ‘fact’ for the former and calls 
the latter ‘quasi-facts’, allowing him to articulate the following thesis of nontraditional 
expressivism as a modification of the traditional expressivist’s bare denial of epistemic 
facts. This is the “Modified Ontic Thesis: There are no epistemic facts, only epistemic 
quasi-facts” (Ibid.). 
In light of these three commitments, Cuneo thinks nontraditional epistemic 
expressivists can say many plausible things that more traditional expressivists could not. 
From the perspective of engaging in epistemic discourse, they can say that: (i) It’s true 
that some beliefs are well-supported while others are not; (ii) One who claims to have 
good reasons for his views is asserting a proposition that may be true and may be false; 
(iii) It’s a fact that not every theory can be supported by the evidence. For they’ll insist 
that we should understand (i) as making a claim about what’s true in a deflationary sense 
of ‘true’, (ii) as making a claim about the assertion of a quasi-proposition, and (iii) as 
stating a quasi-fact. 
Accordingly, nontraditional expressivists will have a way to explain and even 
endorse the features of epistemic discourse that may, in Blackburn’s words, “tempt one to 
realism” (1984: 171). However, as Cuneo sets things up, this is supposed to be consistent 
with the expressivist’s antirealist view that, from the perspective of ontology, epistemic 
facts do not show up alongside the other facts, to whose existence we should be 
committed in any robust way. In this way, nontraditional epistemic expressivism would 
clearly avoid Kvanvig’s complaint that epistemic expressivism is committed, absurdly, to 
both the idea that epistemic claims are not truth-apt and the idea that that some epistemic 
claims are true. Nontraditional expressivists will deny the former commitment and freely 
grant the latter commitment. They’ll just insist that we understand their commitment here 
in a deflationary way that doesn’t really commit them ontologically to epistemic facts. 
Cuneo is sensitive to the possibility of this maneuver, but he articulates a further 
objection directed specifically at this nontraditional form of epistemic expressivism. He 
calls this objection the “Perspective Objection” because it has to do with the way he 
thinks epistemic expressivists need two perspectives—one from which they can engage 
in epistemic discourse, saying things such as (i)-(iii) above, and another from which they 
can state their view including its three core theses. He refers to these perspectives as the 
“internal perspective” and the “external perspective”, writing:  
The internal perspective…is supposed to be the perspective that captures what it 
is like to be an agent engaged in ordinary epistemic thought and discourse; it is 
the arena in which it appears to an agent that she is giving and assembling 
epistemic reasons, epistemically evaluating beliefs, uttering epistemic truths, 
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representing epistemic reality, and so forth. The external perspective, by contrast, 
is supposed to be the perspective of the naturalist philosopher who in Terry 
Horgan and Mark Timmons words is engaged in ‘metaphysical speculation’ or 
‘theoretical inquiry’, but believes that there are no epistemic reasons or facts. 
(ibid.: 170) 
The problem Cuneo has with the non-traditional expressivist’s commitment to 
two perspectives is that he thinks there can be no such thing as the external epistemic 
perspective when it comes to epistemic thought and discourse. The external perspective, 
he argues, would be a perspective from which we think both that there are epistemic 
reasons and facts, and that there are no epistemic reasons and facts. Cuneo takes 
epistemic expressivists to be committed to this absurd conclusion because he takes them 
to be committed to stating and arguing for their meta-epistemological position from the 
external perspective of “theoretical inquiry”. However, as Cuneo puts it, “anything we 
could recognizably call ‘theoretical inquiry’…involves viewing ourselves as assembling 
reasons, epistemically evaluating claims, offering arguments, and so forth” (Ibid.). He 
thinks this makes it impossible to take the external perspective with respect to epistemic 
discourse and practice: “anything we could recognizably call theoretical inquiry requires 
taking not the external, but the internal perspective” (Ibid.). 
So, although the details are more sophisticated, the structure of Cuneo’s argument 
against epistemic expressivism is similar to Kvanvig’s. The thought is that, in virtue of 
their antirealism about epistemic discourse, epistemic expressivists are committed to one 
thing, whereas in virtue of the general nature of inquiry – even inquiry into the correct 
meta-epistemological view – we all, including expressivists, are committed to the 
opposite. Kvanvig thought the expressivist is committed to denying the truth-aptness of 
epistemic claims, which Cuneo recognizes to be incorrect because of the possibility of 
being a nontraditional expressivist through adopting something like the deflationary 
package. But he thinks the expressivist who adopts the deflationary package is committed 
to the possibility of an external epistemic perspective, whereas, in virtue of the general 
nature of all inquiry, everyone – the expressivist included – is also committed to the 
impossibility of an external epistemic perspective. 
The mistake we find in Cuneo’s argument is suggested by the structural similarity 
to Kvanvig’s argument. Just as Kvanvig was wrong to think that the epistemic 
expressivist is committed to denying the ‘alethic status’ of epistemic claims, we think 
Cuneo is wrong to think that the epistemic expressivist who adopts the deflationary 
package is committed to the possibility of what he’s calling the ‘external perspective’. To 
be fair to Cuneo, we want to note that he takes over the idea of an external perspective, 
which is separate from the perspective of engaged normative thought and discourse, from 
extant expressivist writings.6 So, we want to allow that some expressivists have indeed 
                                                     
6 He cites Blackburn (1993: 157, 172 - 3, 1998: 50), and Timmons (1999). Both of these 
expressivists appeal to this idea in the course of articulating forms of ethical expressivism. It’s 
interesting that attempts, sometimes by the very same authors, to articulate a form of epistemic 
expressivism do not typically appeal to this idea (Cf. Field 1998, 2009, Chrisman 2007). So, we 
grant that the idea of a divide between internal and external perspectives has been a seductive 
expository device among ethical expressivists, but we want to maintain that epistemic 
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committed themselves to this idea, but we don’t think it follows from or is presupposed 
by the core expressivist maneuver of changing the question from the nature of certain 
kinds of values to the nature of the correlative kinds of evaluations, in hopes of drawing 
an interesting contrast between epistemic evaluations and descriptions of the world.  
If the change in question were to involve switching from an internal to an external 
perspective on the world, as he is thinking of them, then we think Cuneo would be correct 
in his insistence that there is something incoherent about stating and arguing for a meta-
epistemological view from an external perspective supposedly constituted in part by the 
denial that some beliefs are well-supported and others are not, some claims are based on 
adequate reasons while others are not, or some theories can be supported by the evidence 
and others cannot. However, we think the change in question involved in the core 
expressivist maneuver should be understood in a more straightforward way: not as an 
attempt to take up an ‘external’ perspective constituted by the denial of all value, reasons, 
and evidence, but as a change from  
(i) a question about the nature of some feature of the world whose existence is 
disputed: epistemic facts or values 
to  
(ii) a question about the nature of a different feature of the world whose existence 
is not in dispute: epistemic evaluations.  
In our view, an answer to (ii) can be sought from the same perspective on the world as we 
sought an answer to (i); it’s just that the expressivist thinks the correct answer to (ii) 
reveals the motivation for (i) to be based on the false presupposition that epistemic 
evaluations seek to describe the world. If we accept the expressivist’s answer to (ii), it’s 
not as though we have adopted a strange perspective constituted by the denial that some 
beliefs are well supported and others are not, some claims are based on adequate reasons 
while others are not, or some theories can be supported by the evidence and others 
cannot. As far as the expressivist is concerned, we can continue to think all of these 
evaluative thoughts; indeed, we can continue to ask ourselves things like “Is it a fact that 
justification is required for knowledge?” or “Are reliable beliefs better than unreliable 
ones?” It’s just that the expressivist has a story about these thoughts and questions which 
understands them not to be about some feature of the world, and that, he thinks, makes (i) 
to be otiose or otherwise misguided. This is like someone who says that questions about 
the nature of negative facts can be seen to be otiose or otherwise misguided once we 
appreciate the use of negations (words like ‘not’ and symbols like ‘∼’) doesn’t involve 
referring to or describing some aspect of the world one might have wanted to call 
“negativity” from a hyper-realist point of view. 
 Cuneo may object that surely, even after changing the question, the expressivist 
owes us an explanation of why it seems that epistemic claims describe the world. He 
often writes of the “realist-looking features of ordinary moral thought and discourse” 
(Ibid.: 162) or the “realist-seeming appearances of ordinary epistemic thought and 
discourse” (Ibid.: 170). And he suggests that the whole point of the nontraditional 
                                                                                                                                                              
expressivists needn’t be committed to it, at least not in the same sense that Cuneo attacks in his 
argument. 
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expressivist’s deflationary package is to explain why these appearances don’t force us to 
adopt a form of realism. So, he may object that even if the expressivist’s core maneuver is 
constituted in the change in question from (i) to (ii), the project of accommodating these 
“realist-seeming” appearances within an expressivist view requires the illicit change in 
perspective from internal to external. 
We think this objection turns on the false presupposition that ordinary epistemic 
discourse is “realist-seeming”, i.e. that epistemic claims seem to describe the world. 
While it does seem to us that epistemic discourse involves sentences in the grammatical 
category of declaratives, to which it makes sense to apply the truth predicate, these 
grammatical facts don’t imply that epistemic claims describe the world.7 That would 
require a further commitment to the view that all declarative sentences describe the 
world. Do they? Do sentences like “It’s necessary that 1+1=2,” “The law of excluded 
middle is false,” “I shall go to the opera tonight,” or “It might rain tonight” all describe 
the world? There are debates to be pursued about particular cases, but we think the 
existence of these debates undermines the quick move from declarative grammatical form 
to “realist seeming”. 
And, in any case, it doesn’t seem to us that epistemic claims do describe the 
world; it also doesn’t seem to us that epistemic claims don’t describe the world. We think 
this issue is just too theory-laden for it to seem one way or another. Notice how strange it 
would be to ask your mother “Does it seem to you like epistemic claims describe the 
world?” by contrast to the perfectly ordinary questions “Does it seem to you like this 
summer is hotter than last?” or “Does it seem to you like this shade of blue [pointing to 
an item of clothing in a shop] is darker than the other one?” Of course, this contrast is not 
an argument, but we do think that it is suggestive. 
 Perhaps we are being uncharitable in laying so much stress on Cuneo appeal to 
the “realist-seeming” nature of epistemic discourse. To avoid that, we want to conclude 
this section by considering a simple argument one can glean from his discussion, which 
avoids the misleading metaphor of perspectives and doesn’t rest on the assumption that 
epistemic claims are “realist-seeming”. This argument starts with the premise that (1) the 
contents of some epistemic claims are true. This is seen as a commitment of ordinary 
epistemic discourse and, indeed, something to which anyone who engages in inquiry is 
committed. The next premise draws an analytic connection between ‘true’ and ‘fact’: (2) 
the content of a claim S is true iff it’s a fact that S. From these premises, it follows that (3) 
there are some epistemic facts. However, in light of his commitment to the Modified 
Ontic Thesis, (4) the nontraditional expressivist denies that there are epistemic facts. (As 
Cuneo interprets the point, nontraditional expressivists deny that there are epistemic facts 
but accepts that there are epistemic “quasi-facts”, which Cuneo sometimes interprets as 
“virtual facts”.) Premises 3 and 4 imply that nontraditional expressivism is wrong. 
                                                     
7 He may mean something less committal by “realist-seeming appearances”. If he means only that 
the sentences are declarative and that the speech acts involving these sentences are assertions, 
then we don’t disagree but merely note the unfortunately dogmatic label “realist-seeming 
appearances, for these appearances are as much “idealist-seeming” or “pragmatist-seeming”.  In 
our view, declarative grammatical form and assertoric force should not be thought to prejudice – 
even prima facie – the ontological interpretation of ordinary discourse.  
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This argument avoids the metaphor of different “perspectives”, and the 
conclusion follows from the premises. However, we think the epistemic expressivist 
should reject premise (4). This premise is based on Cuneo’s definition of nontraditional 
expressivism in terms of the Modified Ontic Thesis, which we quote again: 
Modified Ontic Thesis: There are no epistemic facts, only epistemic quasi-facts. 
(op. cit.) 
However, notice an interesting contrast between this and the Modified Alethic Thesis as 
he states it: 
Modified Alethic Thesis: The contents of some epistemic claims are true, but only 
in a deflationary sense. (op. cit.) 
The Modified Alethic Thesis doesn’t involve the denial that the contents of some 
epistemic claims are true. Because of this, we suggest that the way Cuneo has set up 
nontraditional epistemic expressivism imputes a negative commitment that need not be 
part of the view. That is to say, an epistemic expressivist could resist Cuneo’s version of 
the Modified Ontic Thesis, and replace it with the following: 
The ‘Modified’ Modified Ontic Thesis: There are epistemic facts, but only 
understood in a deflationary way. 
This does implicitly involve a denial. It’s the denial that there are epistemic facts, as the 
realist understands the notion of ‘facts’.8 However, we suggest that it’s open to the 
expressivist to insist that epistemic discourse is not committed one way or the other on 
the correct understanding of the notion of ‘facts’ that it deploys. Accordingly, epistemic 
expressivists don’t have to deny that there are epistemic facts any more than they have to 
deny that epistemic claims are truth-apt.9  
                                                     
8 Depending on what is meant by “understandood in a deflationary way,” Cuneo may feel that he 
has already dealt with this idea under the heading of “maximalist expressivism”.  As we noted 
above, this is the view that denies that there are epistemic facts as the realist understands them, 
but allows that there are epistemic facts as the “shadows” of minimally true sentences.  We doubt 
that this is the only way to endorse what we’ve called the Modified Modified Ontic Thesis, but 
even if it is, we think the arguments Cuneo gives against it are not relevant in the present 
dialectical context.  In the last part of ch. 6 of his book, Cuneo argues that maximalist 
expressivism is subject to a different sort of objection from the sorts of objections we have been 
responding to in most of this section of our paper.  His objection has to do with whether the 
maximalist expressivist can successfully draw a line between areas of discourse that are 
‘robustly’ or ‘seriously’ representational and those that are representational only in the non-robust 
sense of being minimally truth-apt and so casting a semantic shadow into reality.  This is a 
distinction expressivists need to draw, and we agree that the inability of a maximalist expressivist 
to draw it would be a serious problem.  However, we believe that this a version of the now 
familiar problem of drawing a distinction between realist and antirealist treatments of an area of 
discourse, once we’ve adopted a deflationist or minimalist account of truth (see footnote 10 
below).  As such, it’s not a problem specifically for expressivism about epistemic discourse but 
rather one of those general challenges to expressivism about any area of discourse, which we set 
aside at the beginning of the paper. 
9 Does this mean that they are committed to addressing question (i) after all? We don’t think so. 
It’s not as if the deflationist about ‘fact’ is offering a theory of the nature of facts, when he 
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One might wonder, however: How can the epistemic expressivist not deny that 
there are epistemic facts; expressivism is supposed to be an antirealist view after all?! In 
shallow sense, the answer to this question is easy. As we see things, the core expressivist 
maneuver involves changing the question from one about the nature of epistemic facts or 
values to one about the nature of epistemic evaluations. Once an expressivist has given 
his answer to the new question by insisting on a disanalogy between epistemic thought 
and discourse and descriptive thought and discourse, and once he has argued that this 
answer undermines the first question, he can just stop talking (at least in the capacity of 
stating his theory). If he does so, he will not have denied that there are epistemic facts. In 
a deeper sense, however, the answer to this question is a very hard one about 
distinguishing realist and antirealist positions once we’ve adopted the deflationary 
package. Part of the reason some extant expressivists talk about two different 
perspectives is that it provides a way for them to draw the needed distinction. However, 
we doubt that this is the only way to draw the needed distinction.10 And, in any case, any 
difficulty that attaches to drawing that meta-philosophical distinction is one having to do 
with nontraditional expressivist positions, in general, and not with specifically epistemic 
applications of the view. So it falls outside the scope of this paper, which aims to 
consider special problems that have been claimed to attach to expressivism when it is 
extended into the epistemic realm and not the general problems that putatively attach to 
all versions of expressivism. 
 
4. Lynch on epistemic goals, epistemic values and the possibility of inquiry  
Lynch (2009) has also argued that whatever the merits of expressivism in metaethics are, 
its extension to meta-epistemology faces a special problem. His starting point is similar to 
Cuneo’s, but the argument is ultimately more complex in its focus on the commitment to 
the value of truth. We consider it separately because we think it helps to getter deeper at 
the heart of the issue. 
His argument begins with the idea that by forming beliefs (as opposed to other 
cognitive attitudes such as imaginings, hopings, etc.), we commit ourselves to what he 
calls the truth norm: 
(TN) It is prima facie correct to believe <p> if and only if <p> is true. (ibid: 79) 
According to Lynch, this follows from facts about what beliefs are.11 Given the truth 
norm, however, Lynch thinks we very quickly become committed to what he calls the 
truth goal: 
                                                                                                                                                              
proposes to “understand them in a deflationary way”. Rather, he is offering an account of claims 
that there are facts, and this account recognizes the legitimacy of these claims but seeks to deflate 
their purport to be about some feature of the world, a feature whose nature needs explication. 
10 This is the issue Dreier (2004) refers to as “creeping minimalism”. He proposes one way out for 
the expressivist, drawing on O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996), Fine (2001), and Gibbard 
(2003). There are, however, other ways. See Chrisman (2008) for another proposal. 
11 Compare Velleman, who writes, “The concept of belief just is the concept of an attitude for 
which there is such a thing as correctness or incorrectness, consisting in truth or falsity. For a 
propositional attitude to be a belief just is, in part, for it to be capable of going right or wrong by 
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(TG) It is prima facie good that, relative to the propositions one might consider, 
one believe all and only those that are true” (ibid: 78) 
The connection is that, according to Lynch, “If I am committed to (TN), and I engage in 
inquiry, I am committed to (TG)”(ibid: 83). This is what he calls the trivial connection 
principle. The reason he thinks it is true is that he thinks inquiry is a goal-directed 
activity, where the goal is forming correct beliefs. And he thinks that, by engaging in this 
activity, we are committing ourselves to the prima facie goodness of its goal. So, the 
proximate conclusion Lynch wants us to draw is that it is impossible to engage in inquiry 
and not be committed to the prima facie goodness of having true beliefs.  
 Thus, what we see from this is that the trivial connection principle is by no means 
trivial in its implications. With TN, it implies that, just by engaging in inquiry towards 
the formation of beliefs, we are at the same time committed not only to a claim about the 
standard for correctness of belief, but also to a claim about some general state of affairs 
being prima facie good—namely, the state of believing true propositions. The ubiquity of 
inquiry would then entail a corresponding inescapability of a commitment to the value of 
the epistemic goal of truth. This result is ultimately what Lynch thinks is a special 
problem for the epistemic expressivist. Here’s Lynch: “…we can’t meaningfully abstract 
from our own epistemic goals, which in turn means that we can’t reach the epistemically 
disengaged standpoint. Yet if we can’t reach the epistemically disengaged standpoint, 
then it is unclear how we can even make sense of epistemic expressivism” (ibid: 90). 
 His core argument seems to be roughly this: (1) epistemic expressivism is tenable 
only if we can reach an epistemically disengaged standpoint. Yet, (2) we can reach an 
epistemically disengaged standpoint only if we can meaningfully abstract from our own 
epistemic goals, while inquiring. However, in light of the truth norm, the truth goal, and 
the trivial connection principle, as we’ve already seen, (3) we can’t meaningfully abstract 
from our own epistemic goals while inquiring. And from these premises, it follows that 
epistemic expressivism is not tenable. 
Naturally, we don’t think Lynch is right. Even if all believers must accept the 
truth norm and that then commits us, as inquirers, to the prima facie goodness of true 
                                                                                                                                                              
being true or false” (2000: 16). Lynch doesn’t endorse the conceptual claim, but he thinks that its 
upshot about what constitutes belief is correct: “Necessarily, an instance of K’ing counts as 
believing only if: it is prima facie correct to K that p if and only it is true that p” (2009: 82). This 
is not relevant to our response below, but we believe that Lynch here overlooks important 
conceptual space between the popular idea that belief aims at the truth and his statement of (TN) 
in terms of s necessary and sufficient condition on the prima facie correctness of belief. For it 
seems that belief might aim at truth merely as part of aiming at something more complex than 
truth. For example, if we take something like knowledge or understanding to be the more 
complex general aim of belief, and we take true belief to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition on knowledge or understanding, then it’d still be correct to think that belief aims at the 
truth, but it’d be wrong to think that a belief is prima facie correct if and only if true. This is 
because there’d be room for a belief to be true but not correct since it didn’t amount to knowledge 
or understanding. So, one can clearly endorse the popular idea that belief aims at truth without 
being committed to Lynch’s principle (TN). And, if so, one may agree that truth is an epistemic 
standard of correctness for one’s beliefs without thinking that it is the only epistemic standard, 
which would undermine Lynch’s idea that forming beliefs at all requires commitment to (TN). 
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beliefs,12 we think it’s a mistake to infer that epistemic expressivism is untenable. In fact, 
we’ll argue that the plausibility of epistemic expressivism is entirely independent of these 
considerations. 
As with our initial response to Cuneo’s argument, we think the expressivist 
should reject Lynch’s idea that (1) epistemic expressivism is tenable only if we can reach 
an epistemically disengaged standpoint. What would support this premise of Lynch’s 
argument? His idea seems to be something like the following, which is remarkably 
similar to Cuneo’s argument stemming from the Modified Ontic Thesis: 
(i) Expressivism is an irrealist position 
(ii) Irrealists about some sort of value claims E hold that there is no such thing as E-
values.  
(iii) In order to hold that there are no such things as E-values, one must disengage 
from any commitment to E-values, which is to take up a standpoint disengaged 
from E-values.13 
Thus, 
(1) Epistemic expressivism is tenable only if we can reach an epistemically 
disengaged standpoint. 
 The mistake we see in this reasoning has to do with the notion of ‘commitment’. 
Lynch is right that expressivism is typically seen as an irrealist view about whatever sort 
of value claims are under discussion, and so the expressivist seeks to avoid ontological 
commitment to the relevant values. Naturally then, in the epistemic case, the epistemic 
expressivist seeks to avoid ontological commitment to epistemic values.  
                                                     
12 As it turns out, we think it’s possible to resist (TN). We also think it’s possible to resist (TG). 
However, for the sake of focusing on the nub of the issue, we will not challenge them further 
here. 
13 Some epistemic expressivists (e.g. Field 2001: 385) suggest that no particular valuing can be 
properly thought to be objectively correct or incorrect. This suggestion appears different from the 
disengagement from commitment to E-values attributed to expressivists in (iii). If denying 
objective correctness is all it takes to be an epistemic expressivist, then the above argument won’t 
cut ice, and it would be unfair to attribute it to Lynch. However, we doubt that this is all it takes 
to be an epistemic expressivist, and Lynch’s official view of epistemic expressivism seems to be 
focused on total disengagement rather than rejection of objectivity. To see why rejection of the 
objectivity of epistemic values isn’t enough for expressivism, notice that an analogous position to 
ethical relativism or subjectivism for the epistemic domain wouldn’t be a form of expressivism.  
Lynch discusses Field’s ideas about objective correctness of epistemic values (2009: 85-86). 
However, the official characterization of the epistemically disengaged standpoint, to which he 
thinks expressivism is committed, comes later. He writes: “…if we are to make sense of the 
epistemically disengaged standpoint, we need to consider the possibility of someone having 
distinct epistemic ends that don’t include true belief” (ibid.: 86) that is, someone who inquires but 
“who isn’t committed to (TG)” (ibid.: 86). Later, he describes the anti-expressivist position as one 
we have so long as we “can’t meaningfully abstract from our epistemic goals” (ibid.: 90). This is 
why we have put premise (iii) in terms of disengagement from E-values rather than in terms of 
the rejection of the objective correctness of any particular epistemic value. 
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Importantly, however, we think the notion of being ontologically committed to 
something is different from the notion of being implicitly committed to some value by 
virtue of engaging in a particular practice. At the very least, there is a cogent way for an 
expressivist to understand the latter notion such that it is not coextensive with the former 
notion. This is to redeploy the core expressivist maneuver and construe the idea of being 
implicitly committed to a value in terms of being committed to valuing something, rather 
than in terms of being ontologically committed to the existence of some value.  
 For example, in campaigning for a political candidate, one may be thereby 
committed to the political value of that candidate—that is, one is implicitly committed to 
thinking that this candidate is better than the other candidates, that this candidate should 
be elected, etc. (Put another way, by campaigning for a particular candidate, one might 
well be committed (implicitly) to valuing that candidate’s success above the success of a 
rival candidate.) However, that is not yet to think that there exists something – political 
value – which the candidate possesses more of than any of the other candidates like the 
candidate may possess more shirts than the other candidates. Perhaps it is that, but there 
is an equally cogent understanding of this implicit commitment to the political value of 
the candidate as a commitment to adopting certain attitudes and engaging in certain 
actions involving the candidate. For instance, perhaps one is committed to attitudes like 
hoping the candidate will win and actions like encouraging others to vote for the 
candidate.  
Likewise, an epistemic expressivist can insist that the disengagement from a 
commitment to epistemic values mentioned in (iii) is different from taking up the 
disengaged standpoint mentioned in (1). The former involves disengagement from 
ontological commitment to the values, while the latter involves disengagement from 
valuing certain things in a certain way. Perhaps the latter is impossible, but that doesn’t 
imply that the former is impossible as well.  
To see what we have in mind, compare the ethical case: ethical expressivists do 
not think that we must somehow stop valuing things ethically; they are not nihilists. 
Many ethical expressivists even think that valuing things ethically is a good and 
inextricable component of the human condition; perhaps (as Kant seems to have thought) 
we’re implicitly always already committed, in this sense, to ethical values in the very 
practice of choosing one way of life over another or one action over another. However, 
all of that is like being committed to the political value of a candidate; it’s consistent with 
disengagement from or rejection of the ontological commitment to ethical values. We 
just have to understand the notion of being committed to some value not as being 
committed to the existence of a certain kind of thing, but as being committed to taking up 
certain attitudes and/or acting in certain ways. Likewise, we think the epistemic 
expressivist could legitimately insist that even if Lynch’s argument shows that we are 
always already committed to valuing things epistemically, that doesn’t show that we’re 
ontologically committed to the existence of epistemic values. The whole point of the core 
expressivist maneuver is that, by offering a theory of valuing, we can avoid the problems 
that attach to ontological commitment to values.  
 So we think the epistemic expressivist could insist that Lynch’s argument from 
disengagement fails in its conflation of two senses of ‘commitment to values’. On the 
ontological sense of this phrase, he is right that epistemic expressivists will want to 
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disengage from (or at least avoid ontological commitment to) epistemic values.14 
However, on the non-ontological sense of this phrase, epistemic expressivists may very 
well be implicitly always already committed to epistemic values, like everyone else who 
arrives at and supports their views by inquiry. But there is a perfectly cogent expressivist 
understanding of that commitment in terms of a commitment to valuing rather than to the 
existence of some kind of thing – epistemic values.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Expressivism is a controversial doctrine wherever it comes up, and we have not 
attempted to defend epistemic expressivism from objections that threaten to undermine 
expressivism in general. Rather, we have articulated what we take to be the core 
expressivist maneuver and considered three recent arguments for the claim that the 
position which results from deploying this maneuver in the epistemic realm is specially 
problematic.  
Some philosophers think that expressivism about an area of thought and discourse 
involves the denial of the relevant claims’ truth-aptness. But as we saw in our discussion 
of Kvanvig’s argument against Field, based on the “non-alethic status” allegedly given to 
epistemic norms, the epistemic expressivist is not committed to denying the truth-aptness 
of epistemic claims. For it is open to expressivists to deploy a deflationary concept of 
truth in order to recognize some epistemic claims as true. That being so, other 
philosophers think that epistemic expressivism involves the denial adoption of an 
“external perspective” constituted by the denial that some beliefs are well-supported and 
others are not, some claims are based on good reasons while others are not, some theories 
can be supported by the evidence and others cannot. But as our discussion of Cuneo’s 
argument revealed, the epistemic expressivist need not be committed to the possibility of 
this external perspective. All he needs to be committed to is the possibility of changing 
the question from one about epistemic facts or values to another one about epistemic 
evaluations, and to a particular sort of answer to the new question that undermines a 
presupposition of the old question. We think this just is the core expressivist maneuver as 
applied to epistemic thought and discourse. Even if that is right, still other philosophers 
think expressivism about an area of thought and discourse involves disengagement from 
our “commitment to the relevant sorts of goals and values”. However, as we urged in 
response to Lynch, this need not be the case. The epistemic expressivist does disengage 
from ontological commitment to epistemic values but this doesn’t imply disengagement 
from a commitment to valuing things epistemically. 
 So, epistemic expressivism is not committed to the “nonalethic status” of 
epistemic norms, the possibility of a dubious “external” perspective, or “disengagement 
                                                     
14 Does that mean that we were wrong to claim, as we did earlier against Cuneo, that the 
epistemic expressivist should not deny that there epistemic facts, and instead remain silent as far 
as his metaepistemological theory goes? We don’t think so. For as long as he has a deflationary 
story about what’s involved in claiming that something epistemological is a fact, this won’t carry 
ontological commitment to corresponding epistemic values – that is one of the central purposes in 
adopting the deflationary package. 
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from our epistemic goals or values”. It does involve replacing an investigation into the 
nature of something whose existence is challenged – epistemic facts or values – with an 
investigation into the nature of something whose existence is not challenged and is quite 
familiar – epistemic evaluations. Because of this, we think epistemologists should view 
epistemic expressivism as just as viable of option for developing their meta-theory as it is 
viewed in ethics. 
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